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ABSTRACT
Cloud computing has revolutionized the methods by which digital data is stored, processed,
and transmitted. It is providing users with data storage and processing services, enabling
access to resources through multiple devices. Although organizations continue to embrace
the advantages of flexibility and scalability offered by cloud computing, insider threats are
becoming a serious concern as cited by security researchers. Insiders can use authorized
access to steal sensitive information, calling for the need for an investigation. This concept
paper describes research in progress towards developing a Neo4j graph database tool to
enhance client forensics. The tool, with a Python interface, allows for the location of
evidential artifacts promptly. Initially, the database contains artifacts from existing
research that can be used to prove usage. The ultimate goal is to create an Open Source
collaborative environment for researchers and practitioners to add artifacts as we go along.
The reasons for choosing a graph database are presented in the paper.
Keywords: cloud forensics, cloud storage services, client forensics, artifacts, cloud storage
interaction

1.

INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing in its various forms has
become a staple paradigm for businesses,
governments, and individuals in recent years,
with Storage as a Service (StaaS), becoming
increasingly popular (Top 10 Security Concerns,
n.d; Six security risks of enterprises, n.d). Cloud
storage services, such as Google Drive, Dropbox,
and OneDrive, allow consumers to store, share,
collaborate, synchronize, and edit data files via
a range of devices, such as personal computers
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and mobile devices (Faheen & Khan, 2014;
Cloud Storage, n.d).
Even though organizations continue to
embrace
the
advantages of flexibility,
affordability, and scalability provided by cloud
storage services, several security risks are
prevalent. InfoWorld published twelve security
threats organizations face when using cloud
storage services (The dirty dozen, n.d). Among
the twelve are insider threat and data breaches.
According to the Gartner Cloud Adoption
and Risk report, 23.2% of security incidents
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experienced by an organization are cloud
related, with 93.5% of those being insider
threats (Cloud Adoption and Risk, n.d). An
insider can use authorized access to an
organization's cloud storage-based services to
misuse or steal sensitive or confidential
company
data
(classified
documents,
intellectual property, trade secrets) (Narayan &
Kaushik, 2016) (The state of cloud computing,
n.d; Mills, 2012). Breaches involving trade
secrets and intellectual property can be
devastating. When these occur, organizations
may incur fines or may face lawsuits or criminal
charges (Narayan & Kaushik, 2016).
The exponential increase in the use of cloud
storage- related services, the commensurate rise
in security risks, and the growth in the level of
threats posed by insiders has given rise to the
need for better approaches and tools for cloud
forensics, which in turn has brought to light
several additional challenges.
The National Institute of Standards and
Technology
(NIST, 2014)
and
several
researchers (Marturana, Me, & Tacconi , 2012;
Quick & Choo, 2013; Quick, Martini, & Choo,
2014; Malik, Shashidhar, & Chen, 2015; Long,
& Qing, 2015; Epifani, 2013) identified over 65
challenges associated with cloud forensics.
One of these challenges is the fact that
investigators have limited access to physical
servers to conduct server analysis. This presents
the investigator with three options; to attempt
to recover evidence from seized local devices
known to have interacted with the cloud; to try
and eavesdrop network traffic between local
devices and the cloud network; to request a
court in a foreign jurisdiction to seize evidence
directly from a cloud server (Marturana, Me, &
Tacconi , 2012). The latter brings additional
legal challenges, such as the problem of
identifying and addressing issues of jurisdiction
for legal access to data and the lack of adequate
channels for international communication and
cooperation during cyber forensic investigations.
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The first option, recovering evidence from
seized local devices known to have interacted
with the cloud, has several advantages. The
devices can easily be accessed, and the cost of
forensic analysis is relatively low. An exhaustive
review of the client devices without accessing
cloud servers can show some evidentiary
artifacts useful in an investigation.
A substantial amount of research on client
forensics has focused on the identification and
analysis of the primary sources for historical
evidentiary artifacts, resulting in large amount
of data, from several sources, which
investigators are not able to connect
(Marturana, Me, & Tacconi, 2012; Quick &
Choo, 2013; Quick, Martini, & Choo, 2014;
Malik, Shashidhar, & Chen, 2015; Long, &
Qing, 2015; Epifani, 2013).
There is lack of research that further
processes identified historical artifacts to help
the investigator determine the relationships
among the created artifacts for more effective
investigations.
The paper describes research work towards
developing a Neo4j graph-based database tool
which allows for prompt location of evidentiary
artifacts with the goal to enhance client forensic
analysis. The question this research attempts to
answer is: How can we leverage existing client
forensics research and findings to build a tool
the investigators can use to locate evidentiary
artifacts promptly, given that one or multiple
devi ces have been used to access a cloud storage
service?
The research scenario is as follows: An
organization
suspects
that
documents
containing designs for a new product have
leaked to a competitor. Th e suspicion is that an
insider might have used a cloud storage service
to leak the material. Th e suspect devices, which
include a Windows PC, MacBook, Android, and
Windows phone, become target devices and are
seized. The devices have some apps installed. As
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an internal investigator, you want to quickly
locate the evidentiary artifacts to prove cloud
storage usage and be able to attribute actions to
the suspect. There is a litigation hold in place.
Identifying
typical
crime-related
fingerprints is hard and the work proposed here
contributes to speeding the process.
The outline for the paper is as follows.
Section 2 presents the process of building the
initial dataset from existing client forensics
research. Section 3 provides a schema model for
the Neo4j graph database and the rationale for
choosing graph databases. Section 4 covers
conclusions and future work.

2.
BUILDING THE
DATASET FOR THE
DATABASE
The primary goal of this research is to augment
existing research by developing a tool to timely
locate evidentiary artifacts, given that one or
multiple devices have been used to access a
cloud storage service.
The architecture of the tool includes a Neo4j
graph database, which contains for each
identified cloud storage service and for each
platform used to access the service, the likely
types, and location of artifacts that constitute
evidence of usage. The development of the tool
involves:

•
•
•

Identification the dataset to initially
populate the database.
Designing the data model based on the
artifacts in a)
Populating
the
database
and
implementing the interface.

The ultimate goal is to make this an Open
Source project where researchers can contribute
similar data, as they carry out investigations.
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2 .1

Building the Initial dataset

The building of the initial database to populate
the database involves:

•

•

•Assessing existing research on client
forensics and providing for each
commonly used storage service a
collection of artifacts created by user
activity, and platform used during the
cloud storage interaction.
• Based on a) for each storage service,
identify a standard set of data artifacts,
location, user activity, and platform
used, as determined by several
researchers to prove usage.

The research targets artifacts generated by
the following user activities; ( 1) installation of a
cloud service on a device used to access the
cloud service; (2) uploading, downloading,
moving, copying, and accessing of user data
files; (3) uninstalling of the service; and (4) use
of anti-forensic techniques (erasing the apps,
data files, uninstalling the app).

The research focuses on commonly used
cloud storage services such as Google Drive,
Dropbox, and OneDrive through Android,
Windows, iPhone, and Windows PC. A cloud
storage service can be accessed either through
the installed client or a browser (Internet
Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, and Chrome).

Some of the notable research assessed
involved accessing:

•

•

Google Drive and Dropbox from a
Windows 7 PC and an iPhone 3G
(Quick & Choo, 2013; Quick &Choo,
2014) .
Amazon S3, Dropbox, Evernote, and
Google docs from Windows XP / Vista/ 7,
a Mac PC, and an iPhone 3G (Chung,
Park, Lee, & Kang, 2012).
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•

•
•

•

Dropbox, Google Drive, and SkyDrive
from a Windows 7PC and iPhone 3G
(Epifani, 2013).
Copy and ownCloud from Windows 8.1
PC (Malik, Shashidhar, & Chen, 2015).
Google Documents, Flickr, PicasaWeb,
Dropbox from a Windows 7 PC
(Marturana, Me, & Tacconi, 2012).
360 and Baidu from a Windows 7 PC
(Long, & Qing, 2015).

Some relevant conclusions
assessment are as follows:

from

the

a. There is a significant amount of
collected artifacts, from various sources
making it hard for law enforcement to
figure relationships among existing data
artifacts.
b. Accessing a cloud storage service
through a Web browser or client
software creates a substantial number of
artifacts that can be used to prove usage
of the service. Examples of artifacts
include the cloud storage service used,
installation location, installed version,
usernames, and passwords. These
artifacts play an essential role in an
investigation as they may lead an
investigator to the possible position of
other artifacts promptly.
c. The identified artifacts depend on the
browser used to access the storage.
Ephani (2013) experimented with
Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer.
Chung used Internet Explorer, Quick
and Choo used Mozilla Firefox, Google
Chrome, Safari and Internet Explorer
with Dropbox and Google Drive for
access . Quick (Quick & Choo, 2013)
findings noted that use of Mozilla and
Google Chrome revealed a Google Drive
account username through browser
analysis. Use of Apple Safari did not
show a username.
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d. As explained in the previous section,
different sources of evidentiary artifacts
were identified, depending on access
mechanism. When a PC is used to access
a service, the three principal sources of
are the hard drive, the RAM and the
eavesdropped network traffic between
the device and the cloud network. When
an iPhone 3G was used to access the
service and a logical extract taken the
specific locations for artifacts were
database files, XML files, and plist files.
e. The processes used by the researchers to
identify artifacts are static and dynamic.
The static approach, used by Quick
(Quick &Choo, 2014; Quick & Choo,
2013) assumes that the investigator has
a forensic image and can use forensic
tools and prior acquired knowledge and
skills to locate artifacts. The dynamic
approach, used by Ephani (2013) and
Malik (2015) use software tools, such as
Disk Pulse and RegShot to locate the
artifacts, while the experiment activity
is underway, and the PC being used to
access the service is on. Regardless of the
approach used, similar data artifacts
were identified.
Understanding how devices, information
systems, and software interact and how they can
be compromised, along with the types of
evidential artifacts that may still be resident on
those devices, has immediate and imminent
impacts on both security and intelligence efforts
both today and in the future (Muchmore &
Duffy, 2017).

2. 2

Designing the Graph

database model
After identifying the initial dataset for the data,
the next step is to provide the structure for the
data, which is the data model.
A model
describes the domain as a connected graph and
relationships.
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A graph is composed of a node and a
relationship. A node is an entity. A relationship
represents a connection between nodes. The
process of modeling the data include:
1.

Identifying
the
nodes,
relationships, properties and labels
from the problem domain. A node is
an entity with a unique conceptual
identity which can have a relationship, a
label, and properties. A relationship can
have properties as well. A label is a
graph construct used to group nodes into
sets and has a name.
For the client forensics graph
database, there are six nodes, each with
the following labels:
a . Service: The cloud storage
service; the set includes Google
Drive, OneDrive, and Dropbox.
b. Artifact: All objects of digital
archaeological interest (Forensic
Wiki, n.d); examples include
created registry keys.
c. Platform: The type of operating
system and the browser on the
device used to access the storage
service; can either be mobile
(Android, Windows Mobile, or
Windows PC). Browsers include
Chrome,
Internet
Explorer,
Safari, or Firefox. Created
artifacts depend on the browser
used to access the service.
d. Activity:
Activities
that
generated the artifact, the range
of activities are outlined in the
previous subsection.
e. Source: The different sources of
artifacts including the browser,
client, and RAM, or network
capture file, and mainly depends
on the platform. Also, possible
pathname for the source is
presented.
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Identifying
the
interactions
between the entities or nodes. The
following relationships were identified:
a. An artifact belongs to a
service
b. An artifact is generated
through an activity
c. An artifact has a source
d. A service is installed on a
platform
e. A platform determines location
of the artifacts
3. Draw the graph data model. Fig 1 shows
the sketch of the data model
representing the nodes and relationships.
The sketch was drawn using apcjones
Arrow Tool (Arrow Tool, n.d)
4. Figure 2 shows sample data to be loaded
into the database.
2.

2. 3

Why choose a graph

data.base?
There are several reasons to choose a graphical
database. The artifacts identified from different
sources are crucial for client forensic
investigations and represent a massive data.
The data artifacts are continually changing as
operating system versions change. Graph
databases provide the best means for modeling
and make it easy to evolve according to changes
in operating system versions. The original data
remains intact, while new nodes and
relationships are added.
Once there are significant data, which is
continually changing, traditional databases are
inadequate regarding response time and are do
not show good performance when applied to
large datasets. Storing data relationship directly
as a graph, made up of nodes or vertices, reduces
complexity and eliminates the extra work
involved in transforming the data from the
model to storage.
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Neo4j has been known to improve
application performance. There are several
companies which are currently using Neo4j
database systems; examples include eBay which
is speeding e-commerce delivery routing using
Neo4j. EBay's same-day delivery grew
exponentially, and its service platform needed a
revamp to support the explosive growth in data
and new features (Neo4j Graph Database
Platform, 2018). The MySQL joins created a
code base too slow and complicated to maintain
the queries used to select the best carrier were
taking too long. EBay picked the Neoj4 for its
flexibility , speed, and ease of use.
Neo4j databases have found their way into
fraud detection, as well. The traditionally used
fraud detection measure focus on data points
such as specific accounts, individuals , and
devices or IP addresses. Today, fraudsters are
forming fraud a ring of stolen and synthetic
identifies. To uncover the fraud rings , there is
need to look more at the connections that link
identifies. Neo4j has been known to detect
patterns that far outstrip the power of a
relational database (Neo4j Graph Database
Platform, 2018).

2. 4 How- the investigator will
benefit from using this tool?
After the modeling of the database, an interface
will be implemented using Python. The
developed
tool
facilitates
investigators'
understanding of complex relationships among
various data artifacts, over and above
traditional relational databases. Using the
designed interface and the provided scenarios,
the investigators can use drop-down menus to
look up information such as:
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What installation activities were carried out
on each device?
What user activities associated with the
cloud service were performed on each device?
What is the timeline for activities performed
and artifacts created artifacts on all the devices?

3.

CONCLUSION

The main conclusion from the presented work is
that some evidentiary artifacts, useful in an
investigation are obtainable through an
exhaustive analysis of the client devices,
without accessing the cloud server. Building a
tool for timely identification of these artifacts
enhances the investigation process.
The growing popularity of cloud storage
services means that this media will be used for
cybercrime, resulting in more investigation
cases. One challenge is maintaining a chain of
custody in the cloud; there is a need for more
research in this area.
Future work should include accessing
popularly used cloud storage services from
commonly used mobile platforms; Android,
Windows, and the latest iPhone. A series of
experiments that involve installing, accessing,
uploading and downloading some documents;
uninstall the client software, and then using
anti-forensics techniques (deletion, uninstalling
and clearing the browser history) to hide usage
is being performed for the popularly used cloud
services, accessed from Android. For each
mobile device. We have started work on rooting
an Android device, to collect the primary
system folders.
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name:str1n

name:stnng
pathname:string

name:strmg
browser:string
Figure 1. Graph data model
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Figure 2. Typical dataset to be populated into the database

@ 2018 ADFSL

Page 157

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

Exploring the Use of Graph Databases to ...

REFERENCES
The Arrow Tool: Retrieved on January 31,
available
here:
http: //www.apcjones.com/ arrows/
Cloud Storage Report 2017 - Dropbox Loses
Market Share But is Still the Biggest
Provider on Mobile: Retrieved on January
31,2017
from:

https: //blog.cloudrail.com/ cloudstorage-report-2017 /
Chung, H. , Park, J., Lee, S., & Kang, C. (2012).
Digital forensic investigation of cloud
storage services. Digital Investigation, 9(2),
81-95.
Dardick, Natalie; ADFSL, Baggili, Ibrahim;
Zayed University, Carthy, Joe; University
College Dublin, & Tahar; University College
Dublin (Eds.). (2011). Survey on Cloud
Forensics and Critical Criteria for Cloud
Forensic
Capability:
A
Preliminary
Analysis. ADFSL.
Epifani, M. (2013). Cloud Storage Forensics.
Paper presented at SANS European Digital
Forensics Summit , Prague.
Faheem, Kechadi, Khan. (2014) , An Overview
of Cloud base Applications Forensics Tools
for Mobile Devices, International Journal of
Applied
Information
Systems(IJAIS),
Foundations of Computer Science, FCS ,
NY, USA, Volume 7-10
Forensic Wiki: Retrieved on January 31,2018,
and
available
here:
http: / / forensicswiki.org / wiki / Computer _ fo
rensics
Gartner, Cloud Adoption and Risk report.
Retrieved on January 31, from here:
https: / / www .skyhighnetworks.com/ cloudreport /

Page 158

Grispos, G. , Storer, T. , & Glisson, W. B.
Calm
Before
the
Storm.
(2012).
International Journal of Digital Crime and
Forensics, 4(2), 28-48.
Zatyko & Bay,J (2011). The Digital Forensic
Cyber
Exchange
Principle,
Forensic
Magazine (12)
Long, C., & Qing, Z. (2015). Forensic Analysis
to China's Cloud Storage Services.
International Journal of Machine Learning
and Computing, 5(6), 467-470.
Malik, R. , Shashidhar, N. , & Chen, L. (2015).
Analysis of Evidence in Cloud Storage
Client Applications on the Windows
Platform. Paper presented at Int'l Conf.
Security and Management.
Millis, E.(2012) "Cybercrime moves to the
cloud" Retrieved on January 31, from:
http: //www.cnet.com/ news/ cybercrimemoves-to-the-cloud/
Marturana, F., Me, G., & Tacconi, S. (2012). A
Case Study on Digital Forensics in the
Cloud. 2012 International Conference on
Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and
Knowledge Discovery.
Muchmore, M, Duffy, J. The Best Cloud
Storage and File Sharing Services of 2017,
PC Magazine, March, 31, 2017: Accessed on
June
29 th
from:
http: //www.pcmag.com / roundup / 306323/t
he-best-cloud-storage-providers-and-filesyncing-services
Narayan, Kaushik.(2016) 5 devious Instances of
Insider Threat in the Cloud; Retrieved on
January
31,
from:

https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/clou

@ 2018 ADFSL

Exploring the Use of Graph Dat abases to ...

cl-security-blog/ 5-devious-instancesinsider-threat-cloud /
NIST. (2014). NIST Cloud Computing Forensic
Science Challenges (NISTIR 8006).
Quick, D. , & Choo, K. R. (2013). Dropbox
analysis: Dat a remnants on user machines.
Digital Investigation, 10( 1) , 3-18.
Quick, D. , & Choo, K. R. (2014). Google Drive:
Forensic analysis of dat a remnants. Journal
of Network and Computer Applications , 40,
179-193.
Quick, D. , Martini, B. , & Choo, K. R. (2014).
Forensic Collection of Cloud Storage Data .
Cloud Storage Forensics, 153-174.
Ruan, K. , Carthy, J. , Kechadi, T. , & Baggili, I.
(2013). Cloud forensics definitions and
critical criteria for cloud forensic capability:
An overview of survey results. Digital
Investigation, 10(1) , 34-43. Stamford. (n.d.).
Gartner Says That Consumers Will Store
More Than a Third of Their Digital Content
in the Cloud by 2016. Retrieved from
http: //www.gartner.com / newsroom/id / 206
0215
Ruan, Keyun; Baggili, Ibrahim; Carthy , Joe;
and Kechadi, Tahar, "Survey on Cloud
Forensics and Critical Criteria for Cloud
Forensic
Capability:
A
Preliminary
Analysis"
(2011) .
Annual
ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security
and
Law.
2.
https: // commons.erau.edu / adfsl / 2011 / frida

Y..!.1
Six security risks of enterprises using cloud
storage and file sharing apps; Retrieved on
J anuary
31,
2017
from

https: // digitalguardian.com / blog / 6security-risks-enterprises-using-cloudstorage-and-file-sharing-apps

CDFSL Proceedings 2018
cloud computing syst ems. Computer Law &
Security Review, 26(3) , 304-308.
The dirty dozen: 12 cloud security threats;
InfoWorld. Retrieved on January 31, from here:

http: //www.infoworld.com/ article/ 304107
8/security/ the-dirty-dozen-12-cloudsecurity-threats.html
The state of cloud computing: 10 things you need to
know: Retrieved on January 31, from :

http: //www.techrepublic.com / article / t
he-state-of-cloud-computing- I 0-thingsyou-need-to-know /
Top 10 Security Concerns for Cloud-Based
Services._Retrieved on January 31 ,2017
from:

https: //www.incapsula.com / blog / top10-cloud-security-concerns.h tml
https:/ / neo4j .com/ developer/ guide-dat amodeling/ . accessed: 2017.16.04

Sasaki, Bryce Merki: Graph Databases for
Beginners: Why Graphs are the Future:
retrieved April 11 th , 2018
Neo4j
Graph
Database
Platform.
(2018). Retail & Neo4j: Ecommerce
Delivery Service Routing. [online]
Available
at:
https: / / neo4j .com/ blog/ retail-neo4jecommerce-deli very-service-routing/
[Accessed 15 Apr. 2018] .
Neo4j Graph Database Platform. (2018). Ret ail
& Neo4j: Ecommerce Delivery Service
Routing.
[online]
Available
at:
https:/ / neo4j .com/ blog/ ret ail-neo4jecommerce-delivery-service-routing/
[Accessed 15 Apr. 2018].

T aylor, M.,
Haggerty, J .,
Gresty, D.,
&
Hegarty, R. (2010). Digital evidence in

@ 2018 ADFSL

P age 159

CDFSL Proceedings 2018

Page 160

Exploring the Use of Graph Databases to ...

@ 2018 ADFSL

